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Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Here is one of the central differences  between late eighteenth century 
constitutions and late twentieth century constitutions: The former make no mention of 
rights to food, shelter, and health care, whereas the latter tend to protect those rights in 
the most explicit terms. A remarkable feature of international opinion – firmly rejected in 
the United States – is that socio-economic rights deserve constitutional protection. 
 
But should a democratic constitution really protect the right to food, shelter, and 
medical care? Do “socio-economic” rights of this sort belong in a Constitution? What do 
they have to do with citizenship? Do they promote or undermine democratic deliberation? 
If such rights are created, what is the role of the courts?  
 
My aim in this Essay is to shed light on these questions, largely by discussing an 
extraordinary decision by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, one that carries some 
significant lessons for the future.1 In the Grootboom  decision, the Court set out a novel 
and promising approach to judicial protection of socio-economic rights. This approach 
requires close attention to the human interests at stake, and sensible priority-setting, but 
without mandating protection for each person whose socio-economic needs are at risk. 
The distinctive virtue of the Court’s approach is that it is respectful of democratic 
prerogatives and of the limited nature of public resources, while also requiring special 
deliberative attention to those whose minimal needs are not being met. The approach of 
the Constitutional Court stands as a powerful rejoinder to those who have contended that 
socio-economic rights do not belong in a constitution. It suggests that such rights can 
serve, not to preempt democratic deliberation, but to ensure democratic attention to 
important interests that might otherwise be neglected in ordinary debate. It also 
illuminates the idea, emphasized by the Court itself, that all rights, including the most 
conventional and uncontroversial, impose costs that must be borne by taxpayers. 
 
To be sure, it is far too early to say whether the Court’s approach can fully 
accommodate the concerns of those who object to judicial protection of socio-economic 
rights. But for the first time in the history of the world, a constitutional court has initiated 
a process that might well succeed in the endeavor of ensuring that protection without 
placing courts in an unacceptable managerial role. This point has large implications for 
how we think about citizenship, democracy, and minimal social and economic needs.  
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law School 
and Department of Political Science. A different version of this essay will appear as a chapter in Cass R. 
Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (forthcoming 2001). 
1 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) (2000). 
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A. A Debate and A Resolution 
  
  
      1. In general. For many years, there has been a debate about whether social and 
economic rights, sometimes known as socio-economic rights, belong in a 
constitution.2 The debate has occurred with special intensity in both Eastern Europe 
and South Africa. Of course the American Constitution, and most constitutions before 
the twentieth-century, protected such rights as  free speech, religious liberty, and 
sanctity of the home, without creating rights to minimally decent  conditions of life. 
But in the late twentieth century, the trend is otherwise, with international documents, 
and most constitutions, creating rights to food, shelter, and more. 
 
Some skeptics have doubted whether such rights make sense from the standpoint 
of constitutional design. On one view, a constitution should protect “negative” rights, not 
“positive” rights. Constitutional rights should be seen as individual protections against 
the aggressive state, not as private entitlements to protection by the state. For people who 
share this view, a constitution is best understood as a bulwark of liberty, properly 
conceived; and a constitution that protects “positive” rights can be no such bulwark, 
because it requires government action, rather than creating a wall of immunity around 
individual citizens.  
 
But there are many problems with this view. Even conventional individual rights, 
like the right to free speech and private property, require governmental action. Private 
property cannot exist without a governmental apparatus, ready and able to secure 
people’s holdings as such. So-called  negative rights are emphatically positive rights. In 
fact all rights, even the most conventional, have costs.3 Rights of property and contract, 
as well as rights of free speech and  religious liberty, need  significant taxpayer support. 
In any case we might well think that the abusive or oppressive exercise of government 
power consists, not only in locking people up against their will, or in stopping them from 
speaking, but also in producing a situation in which people’s minimal needs are not met. 
Indeed, protection of such needs might be seen as part of the necessary wall of immunity, 
and hardly as inconsistent with it. 
 
If the central concerns are citizenship and democracy,  the line between negative 
rights and positive rights is hard to maintain. The right to constitutional protection of 
private property has a strong democratic  justification: If people’s holdings are subject to 
ongoing governmental adjustment, people cannot have the security, and independence, 
that the status of citizenship requires. The right to private property should not be seen as 
an effort to protect wealthy people; it helps ensure deliberative  democracy  itself. But the 
same things can be said for minimal protections against starvation, homelessless, and 
other extreme deprivation. For people to be able to act as citizens, and to be able to count 
                                                 
2 Seee, e.g., Scott, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?, 141 U Pa L Rev 1 (1992); 
Symposium, Socio-economic Rights, 8 SAJHR 451 (1992). 
3 See Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights (1999). 
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themselves as such, they must have the kind of independence that such minimal 
protections ensure.  
 
On the other hand, a democratic constitution does not protect every right and 
interest that should be protected in a decent or just society. Perhaps ordinary politics can 
be trusted; if so, there is no need for constitutional protection. The basic reason for 
constitutional guarantees is to respond to problems faced  in ordinary political life. If 
minimal socio-economic rights will be protected democratically, why involve the 
Constitution? The best answer is that to doubt the assumption and to insist such rights are 
indeed at systematic risk in political life,  especially  because those who would benefit 
from them lack political power. It is not clear if this is true in every nation. But certainly 
it is true in many places. 
 
Perhaps more interestingly, critics of socio-economic rights have made a point 
about democratic institutions. In particular, they have argued that socio-economic rights 
are beyond judicial capacities.4 On this view, courts lack the tools to enforce such 
guarantees. If they attempt to do so, they will find themselves in an impossible 
managerial position, one that might discredit the constitutional enterprise as a whole. 
How can courts possibly oversee budget-setting priorities? If a state provides too little 
help to those who seek housing, maybe it is because the state is concentrating on the 
provision of employment, or on public health programs, or on educating children. Is a 
court supposed to oversee the full range of government programs, to ensure that the state 
is placing emphasis on the right areas? How can a court possibly acquire the knowledge, 
or make the value judgments, that would enable it to do that? There is a separate point. A 
judicial effort to protect socio-economic rights might seem to compromise, or to preempt, 
democratic deliberation  on crucial issues, because it will undermine the capacity of 
citizens to choose, in accordance with their own judgments, the kinds of welfare and 
employment programs that they favor. Of course some of these points hold for 
conventional rights as well. But perhaps social and economic rights are especially 
troublesome on this count, because they put courts in the position of overseeing large-
scale bureaucratic institutions.  
 It would be possible to respond to these institutional concerns in various ways. 
Perhaps constitutions should not include socio-economic rights at all. Perhaps such rights 
should be included, but on the explicit understanding that the legislature, and not the 
courts, will be entrusted with enforcement.  Section IV of the Indian Constitution 
expressly follows this route, contained judicially unenforceable “directive principles” and 
attempting to encourage legislative attention to these rights without involving the 
judiciary.. [Could you mention the section(s) in the Indian Constitution?] The advantage of 
this approach is that it ensures that courts will not be entangled with administration of 
social programs. The disadvantage is that without judicial enforcement, there is a risk that 
the constitutional guarantees will be mere “parchment barriers,” meaningless or empty in 
the real world.  
 
                                                 
4 See Davis, The Case Against Inclusion of Socio-economic Rights in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive 
Principles, 8 SAJHR 475 (1992). 
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 2. The case of South Africa. The appropriate approach to socio-economic rights 
was intensely debated before ratification of the South African Constitution.5 The idea of 
including socio-economic rights was greatly spurred by international law, above all by 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which I will 
return. Much of the debate involved  the appropriate role of the judiciary. In part this was 
a relatively abstract debate, posing a concrete real-world issue but founded on a set of 
theoretical considerations just sketched, involving judicial capacities and the proper 
place, if any, of socio-economic rights in a democratic constitution. But aside from these 
points, the debate was greatly influenced  by the particular legacy of apartheid and by 
claims about what to do about that legacy at the constitutional level. In the view of many 
of those involved in constitutional design, the apartheid system could not plausibly be 
separated from the problem of persistent social and economic deprivation. In the end the 
argument for socio-economic rights was irresistible, in large part because such guarantees 
seemed an indispensable way of expressing a commitment to overcome the legacy of 
apartheid – the overriding goal of the new Constitution.  
 
 We should emphasize a general point here about constitutionalism.6 Some 
constitutions are preservative; they seek to maintain existing practices, to ensure that 
things do not get worse. This is of course Edmund Burke’s conception of the English 
constitution. By contrast,  some constitutions are transformative; they set out certain 
aspirations that are emphatically understood as a challenge to longstanding practices. 
They are defined in opposition to those practices. The American constitution is a mixture 
of preservative and transformative features, with some provisions looking backward, and 
others very much looking forward. The South African constitution is the world’s leading 
example of a transformative constitution. A great deal of the document is an effort to 
eliminate apartheid “root and branch.” Constitutions are often described as 
precommitment strategies, designed to ensure against myopic or mistaken decisions in 
ordinary politics.7 If is it apt to describe the South African Constitution in these terms, 
this is because the document is designed to ensure that future governments do not fall 
prey to anything like the evils of the apartheid era. The creation of socio-economic rights 
is best understood in this light. 
 
B. A Continuing Debate 
 
 But what, in particular, is the relationship among socio-economic rights, courts, 
and legislatures? The South African Constitution hardly speaks unambiguously on this 
topic. The rights in question typically take the following form, in an evident  
acknowledgement  of limited resources: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to [the relevant good]. 
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of this right. 
 
                                                 
5 See note 1 supra; see also Chaskalson et al., Constitutional Law of South Africa 41-3-41-4 (2000). 
6 See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999). 
7 See Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint (1995). 
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This is the basic form of constitutional rights to “an environment that is not harmful 
to their health or well-being” (section 24); housing (section 26); and health, food, water, 
and social security (section 27).  
 
A provision of this kind does not clearly create or disable judicial enforcement. On 
the basis of the text alone, it would be easy to imagine a judicial ruling to the effect that 
enforcement is reserved to nonjudicial actors within “the state.” On this view, the South 
African Constitution is, with respect to judicial enforcement, closely akin to the Indian 
Constitution. But it would also be easy to imagine a ruling to the effect that courts are 
required to police the relevant  rights, by ensuring that the state has, in fact, taken 
“reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
progressive realization of this right.” If, for example, the state has done little to provide 
people with decent food and health care, and if the state is financially able to do much 
more, it would seem that the state has violated the constitutional guarantee.  
 
In certifying the Constitution, the South African Constitutional Court resolved this 
question in just this way, concluding that socio-economic rights are indeed subject to 
judicial enforcement.8 The Court said that such rights “are, at least to some extent, 
justiciable.” The fact that resources would have to be expended on them was hardly 
decisive, for this was true of “many of the civil and political rights entrenched”  in the 
Constitution. The Court correctly said that many rights, including so-called negative 
rights, “will give rise to similar budgetary implications without compromising their 
justiciability.” But in a final sentence, the Court added new ambiguity, by suggesting that 
at “the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be protected negatively from improper 
invasion.” This last sentence added considerable ambiguity, because it did not say 
whether and when courts could go beyond the “minimum” to protect rights “positively”; 
nor did it make entirely clear what it would mean to invade socio-economic rights 
“negatively.” Perhaps the Court’s suggestion was that when the state, or someone else, 
actually deprived someone of (for example) shelter, say by evicting them form the only 
available source of housing, judicial enforcement would be appropriate. But if this is 
what  the Court meant, the socio-economic rights would be hardly justiciable at all; this 
would be an exceedingly narrow use of judicial authority in overseeing the relevant 
rights. 
 
 The ultimate outcome of the debate over judicial protection of socio-economic 
rights carries both particular and general interest. It is of particular interest in South 
Africa, where a substantial percentage of the population lives in desperate poverty. Does 
the Constitution do anything to help them? For example, might the judiciary play a role in 
ensuring that governmental priorities are set in the way that the Constitution apparently 
envisages? Or might judicial involvement in protecting socio-economic rights actually 
impair reasonable legislature efforts to set sensible priorities? The outcome has general 
interest because it should tell us a great deal about the social and democratic 
consequences, both good and bad, of constitutional provisions creating socio-economic 
rights. Thus far discussion of this issue has both highly speculative  and uninformed by 
                                                 
8 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constittuonal Assembly, 1996 (4) SA 744, 1996 (10) BCLR 1243 (CC) at 
para 78. 
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actual practice.9 The South African experience will inevitably provide a great deal of 
information.  
 
The Constitutional Court has now rendered its first major decision involving these 
rights, in a case involving the right to shelter. It is to that case that I now turn. 
 
II. The Background 
 
 A. The Housing Shortage and the Apartheid Legacy 
 
It is impossible to understand the South African dispute over the right to shelter, or 
the proceedings in the Constitutional Court, without reference to the effects of apartheid.  
The central point is that in the view of most observers, the system of apartheid is directly 
responsible for the acute housing shortage in many areas of the nation.  
 
One of the central components of apartheid was a system of “influx control” that 
sharply limited African occupation of urban areas.10 In the Western Cape, the government 
attempted to exclude all African people and to give preference to the colored community. 
The result was to freeze the provision of housing for African people on the Cape 
Peninsula in 1962. Nonetheless, African people continued to move into the area in search 
of jobs. Lacking formal housing, large numbers of them moved into “informal 
settlements,” consisting of shacks and the like, throughout the Peninsula. The inevitable  
result of the combination of large African movements into urban areas and inadequate 
provision of housing was to produce shortages, amounting to over 100,000 units by the 
mid-1990s. Since that time, governments at national and local levels  have enacted a great 
deal of legislation to try to handle the problem. Nonetheless, many thousands of people 
lack decent housing. At the same time, the South African government has limited sources 
and a large variety of needs, stemming from the AIDS crisis, pervasive unemployment 
(about 40%), and persistent, pervasive poverty. 
 
B. Grootboom and Wallacedene 
 
The Grootboom case was brought by 900 plaintiffs, of whom 510 were children.  For 
a long period, the plaintiffs lived in an informal squatter settlement named Wallacedene.  
Most of the people there were desperately poor. All of them lived in shacks, without 
water, sewage, or refuse removal services. Only 5% of the shacks had electricity.  The 
named plaintiff, Irene Grootboom, lived with her family and that of her sister in a shack 
of about twenty square meters.  
 
Many of those at the Wallacedene  settlement had applied for low-cost housing from 
the municipality. They were placed on the waiting list, where they remained for a number 
of years. In late 1998, they became frustrated by the intolerable conditions at 
Wallacedene. They moved out and put up shacks and shelters on vacant land that was 
                                                 
9 An exception is Hungary. See Andras Sajo, How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform, 5 
Eastern European Constitutional Review 31 (1996). Here we’ll obviously need the full reference 
10 I draw here from the Grootboom opinion.  
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privately owned and earmarked for formal low-cost housing. A few months later, the 
owner obtained an ejectment order against them. But Grootboom and others refused to 
leave, contending that their former sites were now occupied and that there was nowhere 
else to go. Eventually they were forcibly evicted, with their homes burnt and bulldozed. 
Their possessions were destroyed. At this point they found shelter on a sports field in 
Wallacedene, under temporary structures consisting of plastic sheets. It was at this stage 
that they contended that their constitutional rights had been violated. It is worthwhile to 
pause over the nature of human existence for those at Wallacedene. For  them, insecurity 
was a fact of daily life. It should not be controversial to say that the status of citizenship 
is badly compromised for people in such conditions. 
 
C. The Constitution 
 
Two provisions were of central importance to the plaintiffs’ claim. The first is section 
26, which provides: 
 
“26(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of this right 
(3) No one may be evicted  from their home, or have their home demolished, 
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances . No 
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” 
 
The second was section 28(1)(c), limited to children. That section reads: 
 
“28 Every child has the right – . . . 
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed 
from the family environment: 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.” 
 
At the outset several points should be made about these sections. First, section 26(3) 
imposes a duty on the private sector, not only on government. Under this section, it is 
unconstitutional for a private person to evict another private person, or to demolish a 
home, without judicial permission. From the constitutional point of view, this is a striking 
innovation, for constitutions do not typically impose obligations on private landlords. 
From the standpoint of economic policy, it also raises several interesting questions. 
Obviously the goal of section 26(3) is to ensure that poor people continue to have 
housing; but the creation of a kind of property right in continued occupancy is likely to 
have some unintended bad consequences. If it is difficult to evict people, landlords will 
have a decreased incentive to  provide housing in the first instance. The result might be a 
diminished stock of private housing. Another result might be extensive private screening 
of prospective tenants, since landlords will be entirely aware that once a tenancy is 
allowed, it will be very difficult to terminate it. The extent of these effects is of course an 
empirical question. 
 
Do the following pages confuse sections 26 and 28? I indicated all the specific spots where I 
think it should be changed. THANKS! 
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For purposes of constitutional interpretation, the largest puzzle has to do with the 
relationship between sections 26 and 28. It would be possible to read section 28  as 
giving children unqualified rights to various goods – ensuring that children have those 
goods even if resources are scarce. On this view,  the government has an absolute 
obligation to ensure that children eat, are housed, and have health care and social 
services. Under this interpretation,  section 26  creates as qualified right for everyone 
(“progressive realization”) whereas section 28 requires an unqualified right for children 
in particular. Whether or not it is correct, this is a textually plausible reading. 
  
The lower court proceeded in exactly this way, holding that section 28 creates a 
freestanding, absolute right, on the part of children, to the protections thus mentioned. On 
this interpretation, the rights are not qualified by “available resources” or by the 
“progressive realization” clause. Perhaps children are given, by that clause, two sets of 
rights: first to the care of adults, preferably parents; second to state support of basic 
needs. 
 
III. Grootboom in the Constitutional Court 
 
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court rejected this interpretation of section 28 . At 
the same time,  it held that section 26 imposes a judicially enforceable duty on 
government; that what  is required in “reasonableness”; and that the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights had been violated, because of  the absence of a program to ensure 
provide “temporary relief” for those without shelter. In short, the Court held that the 
Constitution required not only a long-term plan to provide low-income shelter, but also a 
system to ensure short-term help for people who had no place to live.  I believe that this 
is the first time that the high Court of any nation has issued a ruling of this general sort. 
What is most striking about that ruling is the distinctive and novel approach to socio-
economic rights, requiring not shelter for everyone, but sensible priority-setting, with 
particular attention to the plight of those who are neediest.  I will say more by way of 
evaluation below; let us begin by tracing the Court’s explanation of its decision. 
 
A. Section 26  
 
 1. A note from international law. The movement for socio-economic rights cannot be 
understood without reference to international law, which firmly recognizes such 
rights, and which seems to put the weight of international opinion behind them. 
Hence the Court began by emphasizing the significant background provided by the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (a covenant signed 
but not yet ratified by South Africa).  
 
Section 11.1 of the Covenant provides that the parties “recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate 
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.” 
Hence the “parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right . . .” A 
more general provision of the Covenant, applicable to all relevant rights,  makes a 
promise “to take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
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achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”11  
 
But what does this mean? The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights is entrusted with monitoring the performance of states under the 
Covenant. In its interpretive comments, the Committee urges that states face a “minimum 
core obligation,” consisting of a duty to “ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights.” The Constitutional Court referred to this 
idea with some interest, suggesting the possibility of “minimum core obligations” 
imposed by section 26. But in the Court’s view, that idea had many problems, because 
judicial enforcement would require a great deal of information to be placed before the 
court, in order to “determine the minimum core in any given context.”  In this case, 
sufficient information was lacking, and in any event the Court thought that it would not 
be necessary to define the minimum core in order to assess Grootboom’s complaint. 
 
2. Text and context. The Court’s more specific analysis of section 26 began with an 
emphasis on the fact that all people have a right, not to shelter regardless of financial 
constraints, but to legislative and other measures designed to achieve “the progressive 
realization of this right.” At the same time, the state, and “all other entities and persons,” 
are constitutionally required “to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to 
adequate housing.” By itself this idea is quite ambiguous; what counts as prevention or 
impairment?  
 
The Court explained that to implement the right, the state faced two kinds of duties. 
With respect to “those who can afford to pay for adequate housing,” the state’s duty is to 
“unlock[] the system, providing access to housing stock and a legislative framework to 
facilitate self-built houses through planning laws and access to finance.” What is most 
striking here is the Court’s emphasis on the “unlocking” role of the Constitution. On one 
interpretation, at least, the state is under a duty to ban a system of monopoly in housing – 
to create market s sufficiently flexible to provide housing to those who can pay for it. But 
it is not clear that this is all, or even most, of what the Court had in mind. The idea of 
“planning laws” and “access to finance” might be taken to mean something other than, or 
in addition to, a competitive  housing market. But it is certainly worth noticing that the 
analysis of a duty for “those who can afford to pay” operates along its own separate track, 
requiring a kind of open housing market for those with the resources to participate. 
 
For poor people, of course, the state’s obligation is different. Here the constitutional 
duty might be discharged through “programmes to provide adequate social assistance to 
those who are otherwise unable to support themselves and their dependents.” In this case, 
the central issue was whether the government had created “reasonable” measures to 
ensure progressive realization of the right. The Court concluded that it had not, 
notwithstanding the extensive public apparatus to facilitate access to housing. The reason 
for this conclusion was simple: “there is no express provision to facilitate access to 
temporary relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, for 
people who are living in intolerable conditions and for people who are in crisis because 
                                                 
11 Article 2.1 
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of natural disasters such as floods or fires, or because their homes are under threat of 
demolition.”  
 
The Court acknowledged  that it would be acceptable  not to have a provision for 
those in desperate need “if the nationwide housing programme would result in affordable 
houses for most people within a reasonably short time.” Note that “most people” does not 
mean all people; hence the clear implication is that a deprivation of housing, for some, 
would not necessarily be unreasonable or inconsistent with the constitutional plan. In this 
respect, the constitutional right involved the creation of a system of a certain kind rather 
than the creation of fully individual protections. But under the existing governmental 
program at the national level, it could not be said that “most people” would have 
“affordable houses” within a reasonably short time. Hence the nation’s housing program 
is constitutionally unacceptable  insofar as “it fails to recognize that the state must 
provide for relief for those in desperate need. . . . It is essential that a reasonable part of 
the national housing budget be devoted to this, but the precise allocation is for the 
national government to decide in the first instance.”  
 
        The Court also acknowledged that the constitutional obligation might be adequately 
carried out at the local level and that the local government, Cape Metro, had put in place 
its own land programme specifically to deal with desperate needs. But that programme 
had not been implemented, in large part because of an absence of adequate budgetary 
support from the national government. “Recognition of such needs in the nationwide  
housing programme requires” the national government “to plan, budget and monitor the 
fulfillment of immediate needs and the management of crises. This shall ensure that a 
significant number of desperate people in need are afforded relief, though not all of them 
need receive  it immediately.” 
 
 In the Court’s view, the Constitution did not create a right to “shelter or housing 
immediately upon demand.” But it did create a right to a “coherent, co-ordinated 
programme designed to meet” constitutional obligations. The obligation of the state was 
therefore to create  such a program, including reasonable  measures specifically designed 
“to provide relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and 
who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.” It is here that we can find a 
novel, distinctive, and promising approach to a democratic constitution’s socio-economic 
rights, an issue that I take up in more detail below.  
 
B. Section 28  
 
So much for Section 26 . What of Section 28 , which, it might be recalled, was 
understood by the lower court to create  an absolute right to shelter for children? In brief, 
the Court refused to interpret section 28 in this way. Instead it understood section 28  to 
add little to the basic requirements of section 26?. In the Court's view, section 28  creates 
no independent socio-economic rights. This was an exceedingly narrow reading of 
section 28 , evidently a product of pragmatic considerations. The Court’s responsiveness 
to those pragmatic considerations is itself noteworthy, especially insofar as it suggests 
judicial reluctance to intrude excessively into priority-setting at the democratic  level. 
11 
  
The Court's central holding was that with respect to children, the obligation to 
provide shelter and the like "is imposed primarily on parents and family, and only 
alternatively on the state." What this means is that when children are removed from their 
parents, the state must protect the specified rights by, for example, ensuring that children 
are housed and fed. But section 28  "does not create any primary state obligation to 
provide shelter on demand to parents and their children if children are being cared for by 
their parents or families."  
 
To be sure, the state has some constitutional duty to children under the care of 
their parents and families. The state "must provide the legal and administrative 
infrastructure necessary to ensure" compliance with section 28, through, for example, 
"passing laws and creating enforcement mechanisms for the maintenance of children, 
their protection from maltreatment, abuse, neglect or degradation." The state is also 
obliged to comply with the various independent protections of socio-economic rights. But 
section 26 created no freestanding obligation for the state to shelter children within the 
care of their parents. Since the children in Grootboom were being cared for by their 
parents, the state was not obliged to shelter them "in terms of section 28(1)." 
 
At first glance, this is a puzzling reading of section 28(1), hardly foreordained by 
the text of the provision. Apparently the Court was led to that reading by what it saw as 
the "anomalous result" of giving those with children "a direct and enforceable right to 
housing" under that section, while depriving those "who have none or whose children are  
adult." This would be anomalous because it would allow parents to have special access to 
shelter if and because they had children. In any case a holding to this effect would make 
children into "stepping stones to housing for their parents." But would this really be so 
anomalous? It might seem to make sense to say that children should have a particular 
priority here – that their right should be more absolute – and hence that adults with 
children would have a preferred position. Why would that view be especially peculiar? 
 
The Court also expressed a stronger concern.  If children were taken to have an 
absolute right to shelter, the document's limitations on socio-economic rights would be 
quite undone.  The "carefully constructed constitutional scheme for progressive 
realization of socio-economic rights would make little sense if it could be trumped in 
every case by the rights of children." Here, I think, is the heart of the Court’s skepticism 
about the idea  that section 28  should be taken to create absolute rights. If section 28  
were so understood, it would trump even reasonable priority-setting, thus disallowing the 
state from deciding  that in view of sharply limited resources, certain needs were even 
more pressing. 
 
IV. Evaluation 
 
 What I will urge here is that the approach of the South African Constitutional 
Court answers a number of questions about the proper relationship among socio-
economic rights, constitutional law, and democratic deliberation.  There should be little 
12 
question that people who live in desperate conditions cannot live good lives. People who 
live in such conditions are also unable to enjoy the status of citizenship.  
 
On the other hand, legislatures in poor nations, and perhaps in less poor ones, 
cannot easily ensure that everyone lives in decent conditions. An especially plausible 
concern with socio-economic rights is the difficulty, for courts, of steering a middle 
course between two straightforward positions: (a) the socio-economic rights are 
nonjusticiable and (b) the socio-economic rights create an absolute duty, on government's 
part, to ensure protection for everyone who needs them. The second position is of course 
the standard approach to most constitutional rights. If the government has violated 
someone’s right to free speech, or to freedom of religion, it does not matter that the rights 
of most people, or almost everyone else, have been respected.  This sentence needs 
completion.  
 
 
As I have emphasized, however, all rights have costs.12 The right to free speech, 
or for that matter to freedom from police abuse, will not be protected unless taxpayers are 
willing to fund a judicial system willing and able to protect that right and that freedom. In 
fact a system committed to free speech is also likely to require taxpayer resources to be 
devoted to keeping open certain arenas where speech can occur, such as streets and parks. 
In protecting the most conventional rights, the government must engage in some form of 
priority-setting. But when cases go to court, conventional rights are and can be fully 
protected at the individual level, and not merely through the creation of some kind of 
“reasonable” overall system for protection. The existence of a reasonable overall system 
for protecting free speech rights is not defense to a claim that, in a particular case, a right 
to free speech has been violated. 
 
By their very nature, socio-economic rights are different on this count, certainly in 
the light of the “progressive realization” clause. No one thinks that every individual 
[Should it be “everyone” or “every individual”?] has an enforceable right to full protection of 
the interests at stake. In these circumstances it is difficult indeed to find an approach that 
avoids two unappealing courses: creation of fully enforceable individual rights or  a 
conclusion of complete nonjusticiability. The only alternative to these extremes is an 
approach to public law that is generally unfamiliar in constitutional law but that is the 
ordinary material of administrative law, governing judicial control of administrative 
agencies: a requirement of reasoned judgment, including reasonable priority-setting.  
 
In a typical administrative law case, an agency is faced with a burden of 
explanation. It must show why it has adopted the program that it has chosen; it must 
account for its failure to adopt a program of a different sort. For courts, a special 
attraction of this position is that it protects against administrative arbitrariness while also 
recognizes the democratic pedigree of the agency and the simple fact of limited 
resources. If an agency has allocated resources in a rational way, it has acted lawfully. 
 
                                                 
12 See Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights (1999). 
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 What the South African Constitution Court has basically done is to adopt an 
administrative law model of socio-economic rights. Courts using that model are hardly 
unwilling to invalidate an agency's choices as arbitrary. That, in effect, is what the 
Constitutional Court did in Grootboom. The Court required government to develop, and 
fund, a program by which a large number of poor people are given access to emergency 
housing. What the Court call for is some sort of reasonable plan, designed to ensure that 
relief will be forthcoming to a significant percentage of poor people. On this view,  the 
Constitution constrains government, not by ensuring that everyone receives shelter, but 
by requiring government to devote more resources than it otherwise would to the problem 
of insufficient housing for the poor. More particularly, the Court requires government to 
maintain a plan for emergency relief for those who need it. This is the particular gap 
found unacceptable in Grootboom. 
 
 But there is a twist here. For those whose socio-economic rights are violated, the 
real problem is one of government inaction – a failure to implement a program of the sort 
that, in the view of some, the Constitution requires. The plaintiffs in Grootboom were 
seeking government action that had not, to that point, been forthcoming, in the particular 
form of a right to emergency relief. Hence the Grootboom Court’s approach is most 
closely connected to a subset of administrative law principles, involving judicial review 
of inaction by government agencies. In cases of this kind, everyone knows that the 
agency faces a resource constraint and that in the face of a limited budget, any reasonable 
priority-setting will be valid and perhaps even free from judicial  review. At the same 
time, there should be  a duty of reasonableness in priority-setting, and an agency decision 
that rejects a statutory judgment, or that does not take statutory goals sufficiently 
seriously, should  be held invalid. In the constitutional context, this is what the South 
African Court ruled in Grootboom. 
 
 The broader  point here is that a constitutional right to shelter, or to food, can 
strengthen the hand of those who might be unable to make much progress in the political 
arena, perhaps because they are unsympathetic figures, perhaps because they are 
disorganized  and lack political power. A socio-economic guarantee can have an enduring  
function. It can do so in part by promoting a certain kind of deliberation, not by 
preempting it, as a result of directing  political attention to interests that would otherwise 
be disregarded in ordinary political life.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Should constitutions protect social and economic rights? It is certainly relevant 
that if basic needs are not met, people cannot really enjoy the status of citizens. A right to 
minimal social and economic guarantees can be justified, not only on the ground that 
people in desperate conditions will not have good lives, but also on the ground that 
democracy requires a certain independence and security for all citizens. But there are 
many complexities here. A government might attempt to meet people’s needs in multiple 
ways, perhaps by creating incentives to ensure that people will help themselves, rather 
than by looking to government. Perhaps there is no special need for constitutional 
safeguards here; perhaps this is an issue that can be settled democratically. In any case 
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social and economic guarantees threaten to put courts in a role for which they are quite 
ill-suited. While modern constitutions tend to protect those guarantees, we can 
understand the judgment that, in some nations, they would create more trouble than they 
are worth. 
 
 In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court of South Africa was confronted,  for the 
first time, with the question of how, exactly, courts should protect socio-economic rights. 
The Court’s approach suggests, also for the first time, the possibility of providing that 
protection in a way that is respectful of democratic prerogatives and the simple fact of 
limited budgets. 
 
In making clear that the socio-economic rights are not given to individuals as 
such, the Court was at pains to say that the right to housing is not absolute. [Shouldn’t it be 
“even children’s right to housing”? with regards to adults, the constitution is explicit that these 
rights are not absolute. -- stet] This suggestion underlies the narrow interpretation of the 
provision involving children and also the Court’s unambiguous suggestion that the state 
need not provide housing for everyone who needs it. What the constitutional right 
requires is not housing on demand, but a reasonable program for ensuring access to 
housing for poor people, including some kind of program for ensuring emergency relief.  
This approach ensures respect for sensible priority-setting, and close attention to 
particular needs, without displacing democratic judgments about how to set priorities. 
This is now the prevailing approach to the constitutional law of socio-economic rights in 
South Africa. 
 
 Of course the approach leaves many issues unresolved. Suppose that the 
government ensured a certain level of funding for a program of emergency relief; 
suppose too that the specified level is challenged as insufficient. The Court's decision 
suggests that whatever amount allocated must be shown to be "reasonable"; but what are 
the standards are resolving a dispute about that issue? The deeper problem is that any 
allocations of resources for providing shelter will prevent resources from going elsewhere 
– for example, for AIDS treatment and prevention, for unemployment compensation, for 
food, for basic income support. Undoubtedly the Constitutional Court will listen carefully 
to government claims that resources not devoted to housing are being used elsewhere. 
Undoubtedly those claims will be stronger if they suggest that some or all of the 
resources are being used to protect socio-economic rights of a different sort. 
 
 What is most important, however, is the Constitutional Court’s adoption of a 
novel and highly promising approach to judicial protection of socio-economic rights. The 
ultimate effects of the approach remain to be seen. But by requiring reasonable programs, 
with careful attention to limited budgets, the Court has suggested the possibility of 
assessing claims of constitutional violations without at the same time requiring more than 
existing resources will allow. And in so doing, the Court has provided the most 
convincing rebuttal yet to those who have claimed, in the abstract quite plausibly, that 
judicial protection of socio-economic rights could not possibly be a good idea. We now 
have reason to believe that a democratic constitution, even in a poor nation, is able to 
protect those rights, and to do so without placing an undue strain on judicial capacities.  
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